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choice and the historical purpose of the grand jury as a shield and not an
unlimited prosecutorial tool should be weighed before disqualification is
ordered. A witness's apparent waiver of his right to a conflict-free attor-
ney, however, should be carefully scrutinized as the potential conflicts in
multiple representation in the context of criminal prosecutions are numer-
ous and sometimes subtle, making a knowing and intelligent waiver
difficult.
Robert Bruce Macmurdo
MATERIALITY UNDER THE ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES ACTS: How MUCH DISCLOSURE?
A minority shareholder in an acquired corporation sought damages,
restitution, and other equitable relief under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and rules promulgated thereunder, alleging that the joint proxy
statement issued by the boards of directors of both corporations soliciting
approval of the acquisition was incomplete and misleading in that it
omitted certain material facts. ' The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment on the liability question. 2 The Court of Appeals
reversed in part, granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 and rule 14a-9,4
finding that certain facts omitted from the proxy statement were material
as a matter of law. 5 The Supreme Court granted writs 6 to review the
1. The plaintiff claimed violations of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78N(a) (1934) and rules 14a-3 and 14a-9, promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-9 (1975). The basis of the rule 14a-3
claim was the averment that the statement did not disclose that the transfer of
certain stock to National (the acquiring corporation) had given National control of
TSC (the acquired corporation). The rule 14a-9 complaint alleged omission by TSC
and National of certain material facts relating to the degree of National's control
over TSC and the favorability of the terms of the proposal to the TSC shareholders.
96 S. Ct. 2126, 2129-30 (1976). The petition also claimed violation of rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). This claim was not before the Court.
2. 361 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. I11. 1973).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1934).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976).
5. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975). The court
also affirmed the denial by the lower court of the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the rule 14a-3 question and the defendant Schmidt's cross-motion for
summary judgment on the l0b-5 question. No appeal was taken on these questions.
6. 423 U.S. 820 (1975).
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definition of materiality applied by the appellate court. In reversing the
summary judgment, the Supreme Court held "an omitted fact is material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote." TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, In., 96 S.Ct. 2126 (1976).
The Securities Act of 1933 regulates new issues of certain securities
by requiring, through various devices, comprehensive and detailed disclo-
sure of prescribed information to the Securities and Exchange Commission
and prospective investors.7 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
designed to supplement and continue the policies of the 1933 Act by
providing for disclosure in other areas of securities dealing.8 The objective
of the Acts is to insure informed investor and shareholder decisionmaking
in securities transactions by substituting a policy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor. 9 Section 14(a)' ° of the 1934 Act delegates
authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission to enact rules to
protect investors and shareholders in situations involving proxy sol-
icitations. " Rule 14a-9, adopted to that end, prohibits making a statement
in a proxy solicitation which is "false or misleading with respect to any
material fact or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to
7. See H. SOWARDS, II BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS- SECURITIES REGULATION.
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT § 1.02.
8. See E. GADSBY,I I A BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-SECURITIES REGULATION.
FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT § 1.01. [hereinafter cited as GADSBY].
9. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Shapiro v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973); GADSBY,
supra note 8, at § 6.01; Comment, Reliance Under Rule 10B-5: Is the "Reasonable
Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1972).
10. Section 14(a) provides that: "it shall be unlawful for any person, by the use
of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any
facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use
of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any
security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to Section 781 of this
title." 15 U.S.C. § 78 n(a) (1934).
11. "One of the conclusions reached by Congress as the result of the stock
market investigations of 1933-34 was that the machinery of proxy solicitation
required extensive regulation to compel disclosure to stockholders of the matters as
to which their powers of attorney are being sought." GADSBY, supra note 8, at §
7.0111]. See also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934)(also cited in part in Mills v. Electric Auto Lite,
396 U.S. 375 (1970)); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
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make the statements therein not false or misleading.... .- 12 Thus, the
definition of materiality determines the scope of the rule's coverage.
The concept of materiality was used at early common law in actions
for fraud and misrepresentation' 3 to determine if the wronged party was
justified in acting on the misrepresentation. 14 It was felt that use of this
element maintained commercial stability in preventing parties from with-
drawing from a transaction by claiming some insignificant or irrelevant
misrepresentation.' 5 The question of materiality must be an objective
one. 16 The Restatement of Torts, Second, defines a material fact as one to
whose existence or non-existence a reasonable man would attach import-
ance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.' 7
However, courts generally have recognized that in the interpretation of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts, they are not bound by
the elements essential to common law fraud.' 8
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1934) (adopted September 21, 1935. Securities Ex-
change Act, Rel. No. 378(A)). The source for the provision was Section 17a of the
1933 Act.
13. "The hornbook elements of deceit ... are six in number. There must be:
(I) a false misrepresentation of
(2) a material
(3) fact;
(4) the defendant must know of the falsity (scienter) but make the statement
nevertheless for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely upon it; and
(5) the plaintiff must justifiably rely on it and
(6) suffer damages as a consequence."
3 L.Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1431 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
14. See generally F. BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS 430-31 (3d ed. 1913) [hereinafter
cited as BURDICK]; 2 T. COOLEY. COOLEY ON TORTS 947 (3d ed. 1909); W. HALE.
HALE ON TORTS 344-45 (1896); F. HARPER, HARPER ON TORTS 224-25 (1933); W.
PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS 718 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
15. See BURDICK, supra note 14, at 430-31; PROSSER, supra note 14, at 719.
16. See Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468 (D.C. N.Y. 1975);
PROSSER, supra note 14, at 719.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) (not
adopted); ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 256(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) (not
adopted).
18. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972);
Blackett v. Clinton E. Frank, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. I11. 1974); Lerman v.
Tenney, 295 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); 3 Loss, supra note 13, at 1435; Note,
The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 584, 585 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Reliance Requirement]. Some elements
have been discarded and others altered in order to satisfy particular policy con-
siderations of different sections of the Acts. The varying degrees of culpability is an
excellent example. Compare Section II of the 1933 Act with rule lob-5 under the
1934 Act as recently interpreted by Ernst &,Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S.Ct. 1375




Early cases offer little discussion of the definition of materiality.' 9 As
litigation increased under the antifraud provisions, 20 three separate tests,
which corresponded with particular courts' perceptions of the scope of
liability under the act, began to evolve. The leading case, List v. Fashion
Park, Inc. ,21 is commonly cited for the proposition that the basic test of
materiality is whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the
fact misrepresented in determining his course of action in the questioned
transaction.22 This test finds ample authority in the common law.23 Some
courts, however, perceived that the policies underlying the securities acts
called for a much more liberal interpretation and held material any fact
which might have been considered important by the reasonable share-
holder deciding how to vote. 24 This interpretation gained increased accept-
ance when the Supreme Court referred to it approvingly in Mills v.
Electric Auto Lite Co. 25 and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States .26
19. See, e.g., Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939); SEC v. Macon,
28 F. Supp. 127 (D. Colo. 1939).
20. The increase was to a large degree due to the allowance of private causes of
action under various antifraud provisions, such as Section l0b and rule 10b-5
(Karden v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947)) and Section 14a
and rule 14a-9 (J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
21. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
22. Id. at 462. Probably the most persuasive discussion of this test was in
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).
However, while List has been cited by many cases as announcing the "would" test,
it appears that it could also be authority for either the "might" or General Time,
Inc. v. Tally Assoc. tests discussed hereinafter. Other cases adopting the "would"
test are: Chelsea Assocs. v. Raponos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson v.
Cupples Container Co., 513 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1975); Smallword v. Pearl Brewing
Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970); Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st
Cir. 1966). The test was not easy for some courts to isolate prior to Gerstle, upon
which many later courts relied. For some cases which offer contradictory tests or
cite contradicting authority for their holding see, for example, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st
Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
23. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at 714-20.
24. E.g., Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Kohler
v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
25 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
26. 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (see note 34, infra). Subsequent appellate court deci-
sions supporting the "would" test point out, as did the Supreme Court in the instant
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Finally, there is a small line of cases holding that a fact is material only if
the plaintiff would have taken a contrary course had he known the truth of
the misrepresented fact or the existence of the omitted fact.2 7 This subjec-
tive approach defines materiality in terms of reliance.28 The importance of
the definition of materiality was greatly enhanced by Mills v. Electric
Auto Lite Co. 29 where the Supreme Court found that proper enforcement
of rule 14a-9 was frustrated by the difficulty of proving reliance where an
omission of material fact was alleged. 30 Mills, therefore, eliminated
reliance3' as an element in cases of non-disclosure32 under rule 14a-9.33
case, that the language relevant to materiality was merely preliminary to other
findings. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Corp., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). However, as the
court of appeals in TSC pointed out, it does appear unlikely that the Court would
use the same test in both cases without any appreciation of its possible impact.
27. Vohs v. Dicksen, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1975); Ronsen Corp. v. Liquifin
Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973); Electronic Speciality Co. v. Inter-
national Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); General Time v. Tally Indus.,
Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968). This test also has been cited with approval where
another test was adopted. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co.,
535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). The test is apparently the product of confusion between
reliance and materiality.
28. That the fact was so important that the plaintiff would have taken a
contrary course had he known the truth embodies proof that he relied upon what
was represented.
29. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
30. Id. at 381-85. Without the burden of showing reliance, the liability issue
would consist of materiality and the requisite degree of culpability. Hence the
broader the definition of materiality, the more likely a plaintiff would be able to
show an actionable misrepresentation or omission, and the wider the potential
scope of liability.
31. Id. at 384. Note, however, that the plaintiff does have to prove that the
proxy solicitation was "an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction,"
id. at 385, but this burden is substantially lighter than proving the defect itself was
relied upon.
32. There is authority that Mills is limited to its facts, i.e., instances of partial
non-disclosure. See Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (2d Cir.
1975); Reliance Requirement, supra note 18, at 584. It has been suggested that the
same proof problems do not exist in the case of affirmative misrepresentations as
with omissions. The problem in the case of an omission is that the plaintiff first
must show that he had the existence of the particular fact in mind and then that he
relied upon the negative of it. In the case of an affirmative misrepresentation it is
said to be easier for the plaintiff to show that he had the fact in mind since it was
positively asserted. Therefore, all he must show is reliance. While the proposition is
sound, there were other factors weighed in Mills. The Court noted that (1) many
factors affect an investor's decision, (2) the requirement created difficult problems
of determining how many votes were affected, and (3) doubts should be resolved in
favor of those whom the statute is designed to protect. 396 U.S. at 385 (1970).
33. Subsequent decisions have applied Mills to other analogous provisions of
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In the instant case the appellate court was strongly influenced by
certain language in Mills and Affiliated Ute.34 In adopting the "might"
test, that court was moved by both the prophylactic function of the section
and the fear that injection of "probability" into the test of materiality
would signal the return to pre-Mills reliance. 35 Noting that after Mills the
definition of materiality had assumed heightened importance, 36 the Su-
preme Court rejected the lower court's interpretation of the standard
gleaned from Mills and Affiliated Ute. 37 The Court balanced the policy
directives of the Act-full disclosure to facilitate informed shareholder or
investor decisionmaking and greater stability in securities transactions-
against the proxy solicitor's ability reasonably to conform to the disclosure
requirements in a manner which would be meaningful to the sharehold-
ers. 38 The Court concluded that the "might" test created a substantial risk
the Act condemning non-disclosure of material facts. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (rule 10b-5, clause 2); SEC v. First American
Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973) (Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973) (Section
14(e) of the 1934 Act); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970) (Section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act).
The court apparently felt that the more liberal the test, the more likely parties
would disclose all information relevant to the transaction, rather than withhold
some and gamble on the possibility of its not being found material if discovered.
The test would not include facts which were "trivial" and "unrelated," because of
the reasonable man standard. 396 U.S. at 381.
34. In pertinent part the language provided: "Where the misstatement or omis-
sion in a proxy statement has been shown to be 'material', as it was found to be
here, that determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect
was of such a character that it might have been considered important by a rea-
sonable investor who was in the process of deciding how to vote." Mills v. Electric
Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (cited with approval in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)).
35. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 331 (7th Cir. 1975). The
court seemed to assume two basic facts: (1) that the object of Mills was to expand
the scope of liability of rule 14a-9 by eliminating the plaintiff's burden of reliance;
and (2) that proving what a reasonable man would do is as difficult as proving what
a particular person actually did in the same instance.
36. 96 S. Ct. 2126, 2130-31 (1976).
37. "The references to materiality were simply preliminary to our con-
sideration of the sole question in the case- whether proof of the materiality of an
omission from a proxy statement must be supplemented by a showing that the
defect actually caused the outcome of the vote. It is clear, then, that Mills did not
intend to foreclose further inquiry into the meaning of materiality under Rule 14a-
9." Id. at 2132. Referring to Ute, the Court noted that the issue in that case was
whether reliance was necessary under lOb-5 in case of alleged non-disclosures. Id.
at n.9.
38. -[T]he disclosure policy embodied in the proxy regulation is not without
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of exposing management to excessive liability by imposing an unduly
heavy burden and of frustrating full disclosure by over-disclosure to the
extent of the shareholder being buried in a deluge of information, relevant
and irrelevant, supplied by solicitors to prevent any claims of non-dis-
closure. 39 In light of this balancing, the Court affirmatively adopted the
"would" test: An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote.4°
In an attempt to clarify the standard, the Court pointed out that it is
not necessary to show substantial likelihood that knowledge of the omitted
fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. This
negative qualification emphatically precludes assertion of the test recog-
nized in General Time v. Talley Industries, Inc. ," and its progeny. All
that is required is that the plaintiff show that "the omitted fact would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable share-
holder." 42 In other words, "there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available." 43
Though fully informed decisionmaking in securities dealings is a
worthy goal, its accomplishment via the requirement of absolute disclo-
sure would exact a heavy price. Equally undesirable, however, is a
standard of materiality so restrictive as to require little, if any, disclosure.
The Court chose a realistic test balancing the shareholders' need to know
against the implications of establishing too broad a standard for dis-
closure."4 The Court was also at pains to isolate a standard of conduct
limit. . . .Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its
disclosure may accomplish more harm than good." Id. at 2132.
39. "The potential liability for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if
the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the corporation and
its management be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or misstate-
ments, but also management's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may
cause it simply to bury the shareholder in an avalanche of trivial information-a
result that is hardly conducive to informed decision making. Precisely these dangers
are presented ... by the definition adopted by the Court of Appeals in this
case .. "Id. at 2132-33.
40. Id. at 2133.
41. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968). See the discussion in the text beginning at note
26, supra.
42. 96 S.Ct. at 2133.
43. Id. The Court desired to clarify its intent by defining materiality in several
different ways.
44. See Comment, Reliance Under Rule lOb-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor"
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which would be reasonably discernible to those in the securities field in
order to provide stability in transactions where disclosure is required. The
"would" test incorporates the elements of relevancy and probability of
reliance to determine whether a fact is material.45 This standard is more
restrictive than the "might" test offered by the appellate court 46 which
was based primarily on relevancy. At the same time, the requirement that
the plaintiff need only show that there is a substantial likelihood that the
undisclosed fact would, in the eyes of the reasonable shareholder, alter the
total mix of facts is considerably broader than the test in General Time.
4 7
The standard chosen by the Court is consistent with Mills v. Electric
Auto Lite Co. The major objective in that case was to ease the plaintiff's
burden of proof rather than to expand the scope of liability or coverage of
the Act.4" Prior to Mills the plaintiff had to prove both reliance and
materiality. The present approach incorporates constructive reliance into
the definition of materiality. Instead of having to show that he actually
relied upon the undisclosed fact, the plaintiff need only show the fact to be
of such significance that there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would have considered it important in his decision. That is, the
fact is so important, a reasonable investor with knowledge is presumed to
have relied upon it, hence proof of materiality raises a presumption of
reliance in favor of the plaintiff.49 Showing how a reasonable investor
Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1972). With too broad a scope of liability,
management finds itself in the position of not only being unable to comply with the
regulations, but not knowing how to comply. The result of non-compliance is suits
for rescission or damages by dissatisfied parties. The insecurity of transactions thus
created leads to general instability and unpredictability in the field. While one goal
of the Act may be fairness, the goal of stability seems equally important.
45. To succeed on his claim of materiality, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the
fact is relevant, and (2) it is probable, or there is a substantial likelihood, that the
fact would have achieved significance in the decision making process.
46. 512 F.2d 324, 331 (7th Cir. 1975).
47. See the text at note 26, supra.
48. It is arguable that whenever the burden of proof is eased, the scope of
liability is thereby expanded. It is submitted, however, that what appeared to be
expansion of the scope of liability in Mills was actually only the imposition of
liability to its existing limits, which had been frustrated by difficulty of proof.
49. The adoption of the presumption of reliance approach raises the question
whether the defendant may introduce evidence of non-reliance by the plaintiff. The
authorities appear mixed on this question. Compare Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos,
527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975) with Kohn v. American Metal Climax Inc., 458 F.2d
255 (3d Cir. 1972). It would seem that the better view is that the defendant should be
able to rebut the presumption by showing that the plaintiff did not rely on the
omitted fact. Materiality asks the objective question: Would a reasonable investor
have considered the fact in determining his course of action? Reliance asks the
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would regard a known fact, in situations where many elements could
influence a decision, is considerably less burdensome than showing that
the plaintiff actually relied on the negative of an omitted fact.
Since the standard for disclosure is determined by the definition of
materiality, the required degree of disclosure is the same for both affirma-
tive misrepresentations and omissions of fact. However, if the plaintiff
must prove reliance in the case of an affirmative misrepresentation or
untrue statement then a solicitor would be in a better position affirmatively
misrepresenting a fact than not disclosing it at all. Under the "would"
test, the distinction between omission and affirmative misrepresentation
becomes less important because the burden of proof becomes more nearly
equal. The Court should apply Mills to cases of affirmative misrepresenta-
tion because (1) the ,conservative "would" test of TSC incorporates
constructive reliance, (2) the policy issues involved are similar. to those
considered by Mills in the case of omissions, 50 (3) the change would not
result in a significant expansion of liability, and (4) the equalization of the
burden of proof in cases of misrepresentations and omissions would
promote proper enforcement of the Act.
51
In spite of the relative clarity of the test established in TSC, the
Supreme Court, in applying that test, appears to have created some
analytical difficulties. 52 At common law it was generally agreed that fraud
required some form of misrepresentation or misleading conduct. As a
parallel subjective question: Did this investor actually consider the fact important
in deciding his course of action? (Cf. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir. 1965)). Therefore, a showing by the defendant that the fact was not actually the
sole cause or determining factor in the decision would be insufficient to prove non-
reliance. The defendant would have to show that the plaintiff did not consider the
fact important in determining his course of action. In the ordinary case, this
showing will be at least as difficult as the pre-Mills burden which forced the
plaintiff to show actual reliance. However, the rebuttable presumption theory will
aid the defendant in cases where investors with actual knowledge of the existence
of an omitted fact seek to use the act as an insurance policy. Thus, where the
defendant can show that the plaintiff had such knowledge, the Court should find
that, not having relied on the statements of the defendant, the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover. For an enlightening examination of the problem where the
presumption view is adopted, see Reliance Requirement, supra note 18.
50. The policy factors are discussed in note 32, supra.
51. The equalization of both the standard of disclosure and the burden of proof
in cases of omissions and misrepresentations would remove the emphasis from that
distinction and place it more properly upon the lack of full disclosure, regardless of
the form.
52 The Court examined the questions in light of whether they warranted sum-
mary judgment. Therefore, some of the results may change on remand. However,
the analysis should be the same; only the sufficiency of the proof is varied.
1240 [Vol. 37
result, in cases of non-disclosure legal fictions such as implied misrepre-
sentation developed.53 The question of the misleading quality of a state-
ment where an omission is alleged is a vestige of those concepts.
In examining the plaintiff's allegation that a statement adverting to
the favorability of the acquisition to TSC shareholders 54 was misleading
because it omitted a material fact," the Court asked two questions: Was
the statement misleading? Was the fact material? 56 The statement was
found not to be "materially misleading" as a matter of law; however, the
Court never examined the materiality of the fact omitted in light of the new
test. It would appear from the Court's approach that the misleading
quality of the statement is an element in the analysis to determine whether
a fact is material, or at least that the finding is preliminary to examination
of the materiality question.58
53. See Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEXAS L. REV.
1 (1936).
54. The proxy statement contained a reference to a favorable opinion of the
transaction issued by an investment banking firm to the effect that one factor
considered was "the substantial premium over current market values represented
by the securities being offered to TSC stockholders." 96 S. Ct. at 2135-36.
55. Actually there were two issues: (1) Was the fact that the "substantial
premium" was calculated on the basis of national stock warrants valued at $3.50,
and not the market price listed in the proxy statement, material? and (2) Did the
statement create the impression that the shareholder should calculate his premium
on the basis of the quotations given in the statement? The Court used the same
approach in analyzing both questions. Id. at 2136-38.
56. The approach is not novel. See generally GADSBY, supra note 8, at § 7.04[2].
There seems to be no uniform manner in which the test is applied. Compare TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2126 (1976) with Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d
348 (10th Cir. 1970). It has been noted by one respected authority that the questions
tend to merge in securities cases. 2 Loss, supra note 13, at 916.
57. The Court said that it was unable to find the statement materially misleading
as a matter of law, indicative of the merger of concepts noted above. However, at
one point the Court recognized the legitimate issue: "The real question. . .[is
whether the fact] had to be disclosed in order to clarify the import of the proxy
statement's reference to the 'substantial premiuin over current market values
represented by the securities being offered to TSC stockholders'." 96 S. Ct. at
2137. If the duty of disclosure is determined by materiality, then the fact should
have been examined in light of the new test.
58. The question may appear to be one of semantics only. Closer examination
reveals that how the question is approached can determine the finding, as clearly
shown in the instant case. It is not inconceivable that had the Court weighed the
fact, in light of the entire circumstances, it could have found it material. By asking
whether the statement was misleading, the Court denied the shareholder the oppor-
tunity to make his own decision based upon all the facts. Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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Apparently the Court found the language of the statute ambiguous
and thus viewed the section in light of the traditional common law
approach requiring some form of misrepresentation. It is submitted that
the Court has injected a rather confusing step into the analysis which
serves no function in the context of the securities laws. 59 The so-called
fraud provisions of the securities acts are not confined to the common law
concepts of fraud. Since the 1933 and 1934 Acts are generally disclosure
acts, prophylactic in nature and not merely remedial, it follows that
liability for non-disclosure may be assessed even absent misrepresen-
tation. 60 Also the fact that there appears to be no uniform manner in which
the courts have applied "misleading" causes a blurred analytical approach
which defies continuity from case to case.
It is submitted that the policy directives of rule 14a-9 and similar
provisions are achieved by assessing liability for non-disclosure, 61 requir-
ing the facts omitted to be of substantial importance (such that their
inclusion would alter the total mix), and incorporating constructive re-
liance into the definition of materiality (substantial likelihood that a rea-
sonable shareholder would consider the fact important). 62 Resort to "mis-
59. Since false statements or misrepresentations are always misleading, the
question is not important in those cases. However, the reverse is true where an
omission is alleged. The issue is particularly important in cases of total non-
disclosure as distinguished from partial non-disclosure. Two problems immediately
arise: (1) In the case of partial non-disclosure, how misleading must the statement
be? and (2) Where total non-disclosure is alleged how will the plaintiff be able to
show that the statement is misleading at all? Some writers believe the section in
question is not applicable in cases of total non-disclosure. See I A.BROMBERG,
SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, § 2.6(2) at 51-52 (1970). The cases indicate the opposite.
See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.
1973); Speed v. Transamerica, 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D.C. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235
F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1956). Either result is undesirable. If the former view prevails, the
plaintiff will be forced to an action under rule lOb-5, clause I or 3 to which Mills has
not been held applicable. If the latter view is adopted, under the present Supreme
Court analytical approach, the plaintiff would never reach the materiality question
due to inability to establish that the omission relates to a statement which-is
misleading.
60. It would be a non sequitur to require that the questioned statement be
misleading and at the same time not require the plaintiff to show he relied upon it.
The emphasis is on the fact omitted.
61. A more helpful analysis would proceed as follows: (I) Isolation of misrepre-
sentation or omission of fact. (2) Analysis of the relative importance of the fact in
context of the case and application of the materiality test. If fact material then (3)
Determination whether the fact asserted to be omitted cannot be gleaned or de-
ducted by the reasonable investor from the material given.
62. Informed investor decisionmaking and stability in securities transactions is
achieved through (1) prophylactic control, (2) a discernible standard of conduct, (3)
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leading" adds nothing' to that achievement; instead, it frustrates it by
creating confusing analytical problems. The relative importance of the
culpable act is better assessed by examination of the fact omitted than of
the misleading quality of the statement made. The term is more appropri-
ate when used in a conclusory fashion63 to describe a statement which has
omitted a material fact.64
The language of rule 14a-9 referring to both untrue statements and
omissions of material fact is contained in other antifraud provisions of both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. These provisions deal with the duty to disclose in
such situations as registration statements, 65 purchase and sale of securi-
ties' and tender offers. 67 While the elements of culpability and reliance
may vary from section to section according to differing policy factors, it
seems that materiality, the standard for disclosure, should be uniform and
that the test of TSC should be extended to those provisions. 68
The lower courts must now endeavor to apply the Court's new test
and its operative terms-" substantial likelihood," "significantly altered"
and "total mix." It has been said that language is an imperfect form of
communication, but the new language, if applied within the general
context in which it was given, should be a genuine aid in future analysis.
Kim Gregory Mayhall
a standard which is analytically workable, and (4) diminution of difficult proof
problems of actual reliance.
63. The statute is so written that even a strict reading would render the above
analysis acceptable.
64. This analysis does not purport to answer the problem where all facts are
disclosed but arranged in a fashion which creates a misleading impression. It would
seem that this problem is better left to rule lOb-5, clause I or 3.
65. Section I I(a) and 12(2) of the 1933 Act.
66. Clause 2 of rule lob-5.
67. Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act.
68. See Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying TSC to a 10b-5
action). Had the Court opted for a more liberal definition, this probably would not
be true. The difficult problems of distinguishing for the purposes of defining
varying standards of disclosure between face to face transactions and form disclo-
sure for personal and market transactions are solved by the more conservative
standard. The same conclusion applies to insiders. The test is susceptible to com-
pliance in all of the above transactions. It is noteworthy that the materiality issue
does not apply in cases where there is a strict statutory requirement of disclosure of
certain designated facts (e.g., Section 14 of the 1934 Act prescribes those things
required to be included in the proxy statement). Liability is assessed in those
situations for the non-disclosure alone regardless of the materiality of the facts.
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